The Taliban know Sun Tzu, the great Chinese war philosopher from the 2nd Century BC. They probably have never read his writings, some of the Taliban may never have heard Sun Tzu's name. Indeed, many of the Taliban are illiterate. But they know Sun Tzu's teachings.
Western-style warfare is force-on-force based, leading to annihilation of the enemy. American children know this form of warfare from playing cowboys and Indians in the backyard. Asian-style warfare is more subtle, closer to the elements of nature, and better conducive to insurgent warfare. And like Western children, Asian children--Afghan children--understand their form of warfare as well. They know the Sun Tzu methods of conflict resolution, even during times of extended peace, because the Asian philosophy is so ingrained in their culture. This is not to say the Afghans are a warrior culture, only that they approach conflict resolution different than we do.
For example, Sun Tzu said, "To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." Imagine children trying to apply that one in the backyard while playing army. Or this: "Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance." If that's not a fitting proverb for a ragtag insurgency to defeat the great United States war machine, I don't know what is.
Since Sun Tzu said "You must know your enemy as you know yourself," then perhaps understanding Sun Tzu might help us to understand the Taliban, and how to fight him. More importantly, what can Sun Tzu teach us about ourselves in the Global War on Terror?
Of ground commanders, Sun Tzu said: "A commander who advances without any thought of winning personal fame and withdraws in spite of certain punishment, whose only concern is to protect his people and promote the interests of his ruler, is the nation's treasure." Sun Tzu obviously held disdain for politician-generals.
On the other hand, Sun Tzu was not kind to micromanaging rulers. "There are commands from the ruler not to be obeyed....Thus, if the way of battle guarantees you victory, it is right for you to insist on fighting even if the ruler has said not to; where the way of battle does not allow victory, it is right for you to refuse to fight even if the ruler has said you must."
Wow. Think about General MacAurthur who publicly lobbied to cross the Yalu River into China, expanding the Korean War. President Truman fired MacArthur for insubordination. That's the way we operate in our western culture: ground commanders take their orders from civilian heads of state. Ray McGovern, retired CIA officer and peace activist argues that President Obama should fire General McChrystal, Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan, on the same grounds. McGovern accuses McChrystal of lobbying behind the scenes to General Patraeus at Central Command, and for going public with his request for 40,000 additional troops.
Although the official announcement will not come until December 1st, Pentagon officials have leaked they are preparing plans to deploy 34,000 troops to Afghanistan, 6,000 less than McChrystal requested. It may not sound like much, but 6,000 troops could make a big difference. If this figure turns out to be accurate, it appears President Obama made a political decision, giving McChrystal nearly enough troops to complete the mission, but not the full amount in order to appease his left-wing base.
So where does Sun Tzu leave us with the Taliban? We are caught between our western value system and our treacherous and cunning enemy who fights wars Sun Tzu style. Before we can answer that question we must first ask ourselves some other questions. (You must know yourself.)
What are our objectives in Afghanistan? To defeat the Taliban? Do we annihilate Al Qaeda, or simply deny Al Qaeda safe haven? Do we disengage from the Taliban and limit our mission to protecting the local people? Or are we there to legitimize the host nation Afghan government? The Joint Counterinsurgency Manual says that you cannot defeat an insurgency without a non-corrupt government that is legitimate in the eyes of its people. Hamid Karzai's government fails that one hands down. Do we try to prop up a corrupt regime, or do we hold Karzai accountable? If so, what leverage do we have? So the platitude, "We should fight to win or just get out," over-simplifies the complexity of the entire situation.
Whatever the objectives, I'm certain that General McChrystal has them well-defined in his mind and has clearly stated his intent in his orders.
The next step is to decide what those objectives are worth to us, and if we are willing to engage our enemy on their soil, and on their terms--Sun Tzu style. Because whatever our objectives, if we fight this war on our own terms--western style--we are bound to lose.
Finally, we must acknowledge that winning this war Sun Tzu style--however we define it--might include that our civilian ruler must stand aside and let the ground commander do his job.
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